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JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final judgment entered in the Fourth District Court, Utah
County, State of Utah. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), in that this case was transferred to this Court from the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah.
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err when it set aside a previously entered Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to an improper and untimely motion? This is
reviewed pursuant to a plain error standard. "Plain error is error that is both harmful and
obvious.

This court reviews allegations of plain error despite the lack of a timely

objection, provided, or course, that the trial court was not led into the error." State v.
Cook, 881 P.2d 913 at 914 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994).
2.

Did the trial judge err when it set aside previously entered Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law entered by a prior judge assigned to the same case? This is
reviewed pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. "When a trial court abuses its
discretion, it has exceeded the range of discretion allowed for the particular act under
review." Rivera v. State Farm, 1 P.3d 539 at n. 2 (Utah 2000); 2000 UT 36 n. 2.
The issues presented stem from the second (2nd) objection Appellee filed and was
allowed to be heard on. The matter was fully briefed at the trial court level, and taken
under advisement by the trial court, which did issue written findings.

5

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
I.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7.

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
II.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5, section (e).

"Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment."
III.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4, section (a).

"Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from."
IV.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 5, section (a).

"Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought
by any party filing a petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order with
the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after the
entry of the order of the trial court,..."
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STATEMENT OF CASE
A trial was held in the Fourth District Court, Provo, Utah, during which the trial
court heard evidence presented by both parties, as well as legal arguments and defenses
presented by the same parties. At the time of trial, the trial court did issue oral findings,
which were later entered by the trial judge as written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. Immediately after the trial, Appellee (the Plaintiff in the matter below, and
hereinafter referred to as "HAL Company") submitted alternative Findings and a
Memorandum in support thereof. The trial court set oral arguments on HAL Company's
Motion in April, 2004, and ruled in favor of Appellant (the Defendant in the matter
below, and hereinafter referred to as "Brewer") in May, 2004, when the trial judge
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in conformity with the ruling made at
trial. In August, 2005, HAL Company essentially re-filed the identical motion, framed as
a "Motion to Correct Docket." This filing was untimely, and inappropriate pursuant to
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Nonetheless, the trial court, this time with a different
sitting judge, heard yet more oral argument on this motion, and did enter substantially
different Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law than had been entered approximately
nine (9) months before.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
HAL Company was improperly given three (3) "bites at the apple," until the
outcome HAL Company desired was reached. The trial court improperly set aside the
previously entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law nine (9) months later
without the legal authority to do so. This case was fully tried and litigated before the
Honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen on January 22, 2004. Judge Steven Hansen issued
judgment from the bench, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered
consistent with this judgment on May 24, 2004, and after HAL Company had filed a
Motion objecting to these Findings, and after HAL Company was given the opportunity
to argue the matter yet again. After the case was reassigned to the Honorable Samuel
McVey, HAL Company filed yet another motion, this time characterized as a "Motion to
Correct Docket," and yet additional oral arguments were heard. The new trial judge
improperly allowed HAL Company to boot-strap arguments already made and already
objected to in this second set of oral arguments in December, 2004. In spite of no new
evidence being presented, and in spite of Judge Hansen previously rejecting the same
arguments, Judge McVey entered substantially and materially different Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in February, 2005. The Motion filed by HAL Company was
untimely, and Judge McVey lacked the authority to alter the Findings already made by
Judge Hansen. Finally, by allowing HAL Company to lodge the same argument multiple
times, and without the presentation of any additional evidence, improperly violated
Brewer's due process rights.
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ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEE RELIEF ON
THE AUGUST, 2004 OBJECTION.

Every party is entitled to their day in Court; no party is entitled to multiple days in
the same court arguing the same issues until the conclusion they desire is reached. In this
matter, even a cursory review of the docket shows the gross irregularities in the
underlying case, and the repeated "chances" HAL Company was given to re-litigate a
matter that had been decided multiple times. Namely, the following facts are not in
dispute:
a.

The trial of this matter was held on January 22, 2004, before Judge Hansen.

Judge Hansen entered judgment in favor of HAL Company "in the amount of
$1563.43 minus the security deposit." (Docket, page 4).
b.

Subsequent to the trial, HAL Company submitted Findings and a Judgment

inconsistent with the findings of the trial court.

In addition, HAL Company

submitted a Memorandum in Support of entry of these Findings, challenging the
legal conclusions drawn by Judge Hansen.

The Findings submitted by HAL

Company were inconsistent with the ruling of Judge Hansen.
c.

(Docket, page 4).

Accordingly, Judge Hansen set this matter for a hearing on April 7, 2004, at

which the inconsistent Findings and Judgment of HAL Company were argued.
Pursuant to the instructions of the trial court, counsel for Brewer did submit
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law consistent with the findings at the time of
trial. These Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law granted judgment to HAL
9

Company in the amount of $1038.45, representing the findings of the trial court.
(Docket, page 5).
d.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by Brewer were

actually entered by the Court on May 24, 2004. This entry was docketed as "Filed
judgment." Judge Hansen issued no written decision. (Docket, page 5.)
e.

On August 12, 2004, or in excess of two (2) months after the entry of the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, HAL Company filed yet another,
redundant motion, captioned as a "Motion to Correct Docket." This Memorandum
makes no mention of any discrepancies in the judgment, but merely focuses on the
assertion that judgment had not yet entered. In addition, Judge Samuel McVey
was now assigned to this case. (Docket, page 5).
f.

Brewer submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to HAL Company's

Motion, setting forth many of the same issues now presented. HAL Company
submitted a Reply Memorandum, again focusing solely upon the apparently
inaccurate docket entry.
g.

For reasons unknown to Brewer, oral argument was set yet again, and

without any additional pleadings being filed. Although HAL Company, in written
filings, made no objection to the substance of the Findings entered by Judge
Hansen, at oral argument, HAL Company was allowed to re-argue the claims
presented in April to Judge Hansen. As set forth in the docket, and again for
reasons which appear to be inconsistent with the pleadings, Judge McVey asked
for additional documents and did review the trial tape.

Subsequently, and
10

although the issue had not been raised, Judge McVey did materially alter the
Findings made by Judge Hansen, and now in favor of HAL Company. Judge
McVey took the matter under advisement, issuing a written decision after
argument. (Docket, page 6-7.)
h.

On February 1, 2005, Judge McVey entered contradictory Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, granting HAL Company judgment in the amount of
$7,407.77. (Docket, page 7.)
This Court must be mindful that HAL Company was successful in overturning the
trial judge's decision on the second opportunity, and without pleading for such
affirmative relief. That is, subsequent to the trial, HAL Company filed contradictory
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supported by a Memorandum asserting legal
arguments which the Court should consider to modify the Findings.

This filing led to

Judge Hansen setting the matter for oral argument, in which HAL Company presented
arguments to Judge Hansen which were previously made and ruled upon at the trial of the
matter. Regardless, Judge Hansen did allow HAL Company the opportunity to re-litigate
the case with legal arguments previously made. Hearing argument, and reviewing the
pleadings, Judge Hansen issued his determination as to the merits of HAL Company's
post-trial motion when he entered Appellant's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in May, 2004. In August, 2004, HAL Company filed a pleading allegedly solely related
to the correction of the docket. However, at the time of oral argument, HAL Company
was given the opportunity to boot-strap his earlier, rejected arguments to a new judge.
The substantive effect was that HAL Company filed a Motion to Correct Docket, but at
11

oral arguments on the same, was allowed to re-argue legal issues which had been already
objected to by Judge Hansen. HAL Company was basically allowed appellate review of
a legal decision at the district court level.
Appellant urges this Court to apply the time limit to this matter set forth in Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 59. Namely, and as was ordered by Judge Hansen, Brewer did
submit Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the trial court after oral arguments in
April, 2004. The Court did enter these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May
24, 2004, with the docket actually reflecting "judgment." The trial court did not issue
any written findings. Pursuant to URCP 59, any motion to alter or amend the judgment
u

shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." HAL Company

did not file the motion to alter the judgment until August, 2004, in excess of sixty (60)
days after the judgment was entered.
HAL Company will argue, as Judge McVey states in the "Decision on Post Trial
Motions," that no judgment was ever entered, and that this was the reason for allowing
additional pleadings on this matter. Brewer sees this argument as irrelevant. The only
thing that matters is that the trial judge did enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. The role of Judge McVey, by the time he heard the matter, should have been
limited to entry of a Judgment consistent with these Findings.1
When Judge Hansen entered his Findings of Fact on May 24, 2004, this was
essentially the denial of HAL Company's post-trial motion.

Accordingly, if HAL

Company takes issue with the legal conclusion of Judge Hansen, the appropriate steps to
1

Brewer did submit an appropriate judgment to the court in August, 2004.
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have taken would have been to file an appeal. If this is the case, then the applicable rule
would be either Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 or Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule 5. HAL Company plainly missed
This Court must see the actions of Judge McVey for what they are: he did not
"'correct the docket, rather he substituted his legal opinion with that of Judge Hansen. The
legal issue had been briefed and argued to Judge Hansen, triggering the application of the
appellate rules, not some mischaracterized "Motion to Correct Docket." Rather than
correcting the docket, Judge McVey altered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in a material manner, thereby eviscerating the prior ruling of Judge Hansen. This activity
can only be done by an appellate court, and the appellate rules for filing such an appeal
apply. It is undisputed that HAL Company missed the timelines for such an appeal,
whether treated as an appeal from a final judgment or an interlocutory appeal of Judge
Hansen's denial of the February, 2004 Motion.
Further, Brewer was under no obligation to inform HAL Company of the entry of
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Namely, the hearing which precipitated
their filing and entry was as a result of the oral arguments held pursuant to the request of
HAL Company and pursuant to its motion.

HAL Company filed a motion which was

denied by Judge Hansen on May 24, 2004. HAL Company did nothing in response to the
denial of its Motion until August, 2004, and Brewer was not obligated to inform HAL
Company of this denial.

By this time HAL Company acted, there is no rule of Civil or

Appellate procedure available to it to allow the relief given to it by Judge McVey.
Finally, the net result of the actions of the trial court have been to shift burdens.
13

Namely, if HAL Company felt strongly about the legal arguments made to Judge Hansen
in April, 2004, HAL Company should have appealed from Judge Hansen's decision.
Rather, HAL Company couched what would turn out to be its second bite at the apple as
a "motion to correct docket," and in that the case had been fortuitously reassigned,
benefited from a different judge entering a different decision on a matter that had been
decided. The plain improprieties below have shifted the appellate burden, improperly, to
Brewer.
II.

APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED.

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." This case features a full trial of the
matter, with the determination of the trial judge being essentially overturned nine (9)
months later and without the presentation of any new or additional evidence is in direct
contravention of this principle. To allow a party unhappy with the decision of the trial
court to re-plead the case at the trial court level is an obvious example of such a violation.
III.

JUDGE MCVEY LACKED AUTHORITY TO ALTER OR AMEND
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

It is the purpose of the trial judge to make a determination as to the veracity of the
parties' testifying, to evaluate the legal arguments and claims made, and to issue findings
and conclusions consistent with the decision of the trial judge. These decisions, if clearly
erroneous, can be appealed to a higher court for a determination, but should not be
allowed to be repeatedly debated in from of the same trial court until a satisfactory
conclusion is reached. Compounding the confusion below is that in this case a different
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judge altered the decision. With all due respect to Judge McVey, why should his
subsequent analysis of the case presented be given any greater weight than the decision
made by Judge Hansen, on two occasions? They are both judges of the district court,
with equal and concurrent jurisdiction, so how is it that Judge McVey was essentially
allowed to "overturn" the decision of Judge Hansen? Brewer would suggest that this is
entirely inappropriate, and represents yet another example of the due process rights of
Brewer which have been trampled.
Brewer can find no authority which would allow a judge of the district court to
examine the evidence taken by another judge, and to draw a differing legal conclusion.
This appears to be the exclusive purview of the appellate,court, and Judge McVey has
improperly substituted his opinion of the matter presented with the rightful place of the
appellate court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant seeks remand to the District Court for the entry of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in conformity therewith, consistent with the Findings
made at the time of trial, and consistent with the Findings entered on May 24, 2004 by
the trial judge.
DATED this 2*L day of October, 2005.

m R. Goodman, Jr.
f5 East Cottonwood Parkway, Ste. 500
Lake City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801)990-3300
Facsimile: (801)990-3305
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am employed by Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., L.C., and that I
served two (2) true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, via first
class mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Jackson Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON, P.C.
120 East 300 North Street
PO Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
on this y i day of October, 2005.

R. Goodman, Jr.
rney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM #1

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HAL COMPANY vs.

MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS

CASE NUMBER 020405666 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
GARY D STOTT
PARTIES
Plaintiff - HAL COMPANY
PROVO, UT 84603
Represented by: JACKSON B HOWARD
Defendant - MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
Represented by: JOSEPH R GOODMAN JR
Defendant - JEFF BREWER
Represented by: JOSEPH R GOODMAN JR
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due :
Amount Paid :
Credit :
Balance :

BAIL/CASH BONDS

Posted
Applied
Forfeited
Balance

500.50
500.50
0.00
0.00
600.00
0.00
0.00
600.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 2K-10K
Amount Due:
90.00
Amount Paid:
90.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00

0.50
0.50

Printed: 04/21/05 10:48:33
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0 00
0 00

Amount Credit
Balance:
DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

205
205
0
0

00
00
00
00

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals
Posted By: JOSEPH R GOODMAN JR
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
Balance:
300.00
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Civil, Mi
Posted By
HOWARD LEWIS Sc PETERSON
Posted
300.00
Forfeited
0.00
Refunded
0.00
Balance
300.00
CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
Case filed by rebeccmw
Judge BURNINGHAM assigned.
Filed: Complaint
Fee Account created
Total Due:
90.00
COMPLAINT 2K-10K
Payment Received:
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 2K-10K
01-30-03 Filed return: Summons
Party Served: MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: January 27, 2003
01-30-03 Filed return: Summons
Party Served: BREWER, JEFF
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: January 27, 2003
02-18-03 Filed: Answer
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
JEFF BREWER
12-20-02
12-20-02
12-20-02
12-20-02
12-20-02

02-20-03 Filed: Answer
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
JEFF BREWER

Printed: 04/21/05 10:48:34
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03-13- •03
03-31- 03
05-09- 03
05-19- 03

Filed: Notice Of Telephonic Attorney Planning Meeting
Filed: Substitution Of Counsel
Filed: Plaintiff's Initial Disclosures
Filed: Notice Of Withdrawal Notice Of Appearance Notice Of
Change Of Address
05-19- 03 Filed: Inititial Disclosures
09-20- 03 Judge JUDGE assigned.
09-25- 03 Filed: Request for Scheduling Conference
09-26- 03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020405666 ID 1635817
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONF is scheduled.
Date: 11/14/2003
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Third floor, Rm 302
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: DIVISION 04 JUDGE
09-26-03 PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on November 14, 2003 at
10:00 AM in Third floor, Rm 302 with Judge JUDGE.
11-14 -03 Filed: Attorney Planning Meeting Report
11-14 -03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Clerk:
shellys
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JACKSON HOWARD
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
Video
Tape Number:
78
Tape Count: 10:59

HEARING
TAPE: 78
COUNT: 10:59
Both parties are present, this matter is set for a Bench Trial on
January 22, 2004 1:00 p.m. All Documents counsel is planning on
using at trial must be exchanged at least 3 0 days prior to trial.
Judge Laycock is presiding for Division #4.
Judge Laycock is on the bench for Division #4.
11-17-03 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 22, 2004 at 01:00 PM in Third
floor, Rm 302 with Judge JUDGE.
12-15-03 Filed: Partial Disclosures
01-22-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Trial
Judge:
STEVEN L. HANSEN
Clerk:
emilyp
PRESENT

Printed: 04/21/05 10:48:56
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Defendant(s): JEFF BREWER
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JACKSON HOWARD
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
Video
Tape Number:
7
Tape Count: 1:34

TRIAL
TAPE: 7
COUNT: 1:34
Both parties are represented by counsel, and both present their
opening argument. Mark Dan Fish is sworn in examined &
cross-examined. Sterling Lewis is sworn in examined &
cross-examined. Catherine Schirman is sworn in examined &
cross-examined.
Jackson Howard is sworn in and he testifies as to plaintiffs
attorney's fees. William Clausen is sworn in examined &
cross-examined. Jeff Brewer is sworn in examined & cross-examined.
Mr. Fish is re-examined 5c cross-examined. Mrs. Schirmer is
recalled and examined.
COUNT: 4:05
Counsel from both sides present their closing arguments. The
court finds that this is a constructive unlawful detainer, no
attorney's fees are awarded, defendant is order to pay for new
carpet. The security deposit is to be deducted from the carpet bill
, judgment is granted in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$1563,43 minus the security deposit. Joseph Goodman is instructed
to prepare the Judgment and Order. Judge Hansen is presiding for
Div #4 today.
02-09-04 Filed: Motion for Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment and Decree
02-09-04 Filed: Memorandum in support of Motion for Entry of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree
03-10-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020405666 ID 1740030
HEARING ON MOTION is scheduled.
Date: 04/07/2004
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Second floor, Rm 203
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: STEVEN L. HANSEN
03-10-04 HEARING ON MOTION scheduled on April 07, 2004 at 08:30 AM in
Second floor, Rm 2 03 with Judge HANSEN.
03-31-04 Filed: FAXED Memorandum of Defendants in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Findings and Judgment
04-05-04 Filed: Memorandum of Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Entry of Findings and Judgment

Printed: 04/21/05 10:49:02
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04-07-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING ON MOTION
Judge:
STEVEN L. HANSEN
Clerk:
taras
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JACKSON HOWARD
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
Video
Tape Number:
16
Tape Count: 8:43

HEARING
TAPE: 16
COUNT: 8:43
This matter comes before the court for a hearing. The Court
addresses plaintiff's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
Court inquires why Mr. Goodman did not prepare the findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
Mr. Howard argues plaintiff's findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Mr. Goodman responds. The Court advises Mr. Goodman to
prepare and submit finding of fact and conclusions of law by April
14, 2004.
The Court takes matter under advisement.
04-16-04 Judge MCVEY assigned.
05-24-04 Filed judgment: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judge shansen
Signed May 24, 2004
05-24-04 Case Disposition is Judgment
taras
Disposition Judge is SAMUEL MCVEY
taras
08-12-04 Filed: Motion to Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
08-16-04 Filed: Motion to Correct Docket
08-16-04 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Motion to Correct Docket
08-25-04 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Vacate Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law/Motion to Correct Docket/Request
for Attorney's Fees
08-30-04 Filed: Objection to Form of Judgment
08-3 0-04 Filed: Reply Memorandum Supporting Motion to Vacate and Motion
to Correct Docket
09-22-04 Filed: Request for Oral Argument
10-04-04 ORAL ARGUMENTS scheduled on November 12, 2004 at 08:30 AM in
Third floor, Rm 302 with Judge MCVEY.
10-04-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020405666 ID 1880687
ORAL ARGUMENTS is scheduled.
Date: 11/12/2004
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Third floor, Rm 302
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W

Printed: 04/21/05 10:49:17
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PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: SAMUEL MCVEY
10-13-04 Filed: Returned Mail - Joseph R Goodman, Jr - not deliverable
as addressed
10-19-04 Note: Resent notice to Joseph Goodman JR at 2825 E Cottonwood
Parkway #500, SLC 84121 (took the PO Box off)
10-25-04 Filed: Motion to Continue Oral Arguments Set for November 12,
2004
10-27-04 Filed: Letter from Jackson Howard regarding Judge Hansen
hearing Oral Arguments
11-09-04 Filed order: Order (continuing 9/12/04 oral arguments)
Judge smcvey
Signed November 09, 2004
11-09-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020405666 ID 1907067
ORAL ARGUMENTS.
Date: 12/10/2004
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Third floor, Rm 302
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: SAMUEL MCVEY
The reason for the change is Counsel's request.
11-09-04 ORAL ARGUMENTS rescheduled on December 10, 2004 at 02:00 PM
Reason: Counsel's request..
12-10-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENTS
Judge:
SAMUEL MCVEY
Clerk:
ambere
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JACKSON B HOWARD
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOSEPH R GOODMAN JR
Audio
Tape Number:
04-70 302
Tape Count: 2:05-2:34

HEARING
This matter comes before the Court for Oral Arguments on the post
trial motions. Mr. Goodman addresses the Court. Mr. Howard
responds. Mr. Howard addresses the Court regarding damages. Mr.
Goodman responds.
The Court takes this matter under advisement. The Court requests
that Mr. Howard deliver a copy of the agreement between the
parties, as there is not one attached to the complaint. The Court
will send out a written ruling on this matter.
12-10-04 Filed: Lease Agreement
12-21-04 Filed order: Decision on Post-Trial Motions
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12-31-04
02-01-05

02-01-05

02-01-05

02-01-05
02-04-05
03-04-05
03-04-05
03-04-05
03-04-05
03-04-05
03-04-05
03-07-05

03-11-05

03-11-05

03-16-05
03-16-05
03-18-05
03-18-05
03-18-05
03-18-05
03-18-05
03-18-05
03-18-05
03-21-05

Judge smcvey
Signed December 20, 2004
Judge STOTT assigned.
Filed order: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judge smcvey
Signed January 27, 2005
Judgment #1 Entered
Debtor:
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
Creditor: HAL COMPANY
Debtor:
JEFF BREWER
7,407.77 Total Judgment
7,407.77 Judgment Grand Total
Filed judgment: Judgment and Decree
Judge smcvey
Signed January 27, 2005
Case Disposition is Judgment
ambere
Disposition Judge is SAMUEL MCVEY
ambere
Filed: Notice of Judgment
Filed: Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal
Filed: Notice of Appeal/Notice of Filing of Bond
Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL; Record Number 8
Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
Bond Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
Note: A certified copy of the Notice of Appeal was sent to the
Utah Supreme Court on this date, via State Mail with tracking
number 55500012809.
Filed: Letter from the Utah Court of Appeals to Mr. Goodman
dated March 10, 2005-- Their case number is 20050226--CA. This
case has been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Filed: Copy of Order from the Utah Supreme Court--Matter is
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for Disposition. Case
number 20050226--CA.
Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.50
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.50
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
Filed: Notice of Deposit of Cost Bond on Appeal
Filed: Memorandum Opposing Motion for Extension of Time to
Appeal
Filed: Notice of Cross-Appeal
Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
Bond Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
Note: A Certified copy of the Notice of Cross- Appeal was sent
to the Utah Court of Appeals via State Mail with tracking
number #55500013010.
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03-25-05 Filed: Letter from the Utah Court of Appeals to Mr. Howard

dated March 23, 2005--Cross Appeal has been filed and that
number is 20050226--CA
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ADDENDUM #2

JACKSON HOWARD (1548), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,372-9

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HAL COMPANY,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Plaintiff,
vs.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and JEFF
BREWER,

Case No. 020405666
Division No. 4

Defendants.
COMES NOW the plaintiff and submits this memorandum in support of its Motion for Entry
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree filed herewith.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO
RECONSIDER AND CORRECT ITS DECISION.
Although the court has already announced a decision, no formal order has been entered. In
a case in an identical posture, the Utah Supreme Court held: "It is settled law that a trial court is free
to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment." Ron Shepherd
Insurance. Inc. v. Shields. 882 P.2d 650,654 (Utah 1994).

Plaintiff shows below that certain rulings of the Court were contrary to established law.
Plaintiff respectfully submits the Court has the authority and power to change its decision, and should
do so.

POINT II
THE WRITTEN LEASE REMAINED IN EFFECT
DURING THE HOLD-OVER PERIOD.
The Utah Supreme Court has directly held that attorney fee and other provisions of a lease
remain in effect during a hold-over period. Plaintiff submits the Court's ruling to the contrary was
error and should be corrected.
The parties entered into a written lease agreement on February 1, 1996, which by its terms
expired on January 31, 1999. The lease had a hold-over provision, provision 20, which states as
follows:
If Tenant remains in possession of the Premises or any part thereof
after the expiration of the term hereof, with or without express written
consent of Landlord, such occupancy shall be a tenancy from month
to month at a rental in the amount of the last monthly rental,/?/^ all
other charges as payable hereunder, and upon all the terms hereof
applicable to a month to month tenancy.
Italics added.
The Court indicated concern as to whether the lease had terminated automatically, and
whether this provision pertained only to the payment of rents but did not incorporate any of the other
provisions of the lease.
It is the plaintiffs contention that provision 20 by its terms is sufficiently explicit to
demonstrate that the lease is totally enforceable; however, a fortiori, it is enforceable because all of
the parties have couched their contentions and claims upon the existence of this lease agreement.
2

Notwithstanding the strength of this provision in the lease, the courts have uniformly held that the
terms of a written lease agreement pertain to any hold-over period.
The most important case on this subject is Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah
1988). This case is almost identical in facts to the instant case. In that case, the successor to the
tenant had attempted to negotiate a new lease with the owner, but had been unsuccessful in agreeing
on the terms. The tenant stayed on the premises after the lease had expired by its own terms,
contending he had a right to be on the premises under an oral contract the terms of which varied from
the written lease agreement. The court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the written lease agreement
was still in effect and stated as follows:
It is a firmly established rule that proof of a holding over after the
expiration of the fixed term in a lease gives rise to the presumption
which, in the absence of contrary evidence, will be controlling that the
holdover tenant continues to be bound by the covenants which were
binding upon him during the fixed term.
499 P.2d at 503.
As in the instant case, the tenant claimed the attorney fee provisions of the lease agreement
no longer applied.

The Supreme Court rejected that claim and held the attorney fee provisions

remained in effect:
Since there was no evidence by either party that the provisions and
conditions of the written lease were modified during the month-tomonth tenancy except for the increase in the amount of rent, the
provision in the 1961 lease regarding attorney fees remained binding
on the parties until the month-to-month tenancy expired on November
30,1981.

Id
The court then remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees,
including those on appeal, together with trial and appeal costs. This, of course, was a correct
decision and is applicable to the lease in this case. The general rule is that all provisions of the lease
3

governed during the holdover period. No evidence was presented to require a different result. It
follows that the attorney fee and other lease provisions were still in effect.

POINT III
THE FACT THAT A FIXTURE REVERTS TO THE OWNER OF THE
PREMISES DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE OWNER FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES BY REASON OF THE REPLACEMENT
OF A FIXTURE AND ITS REMOVAL.
In this case, the defendant Multi Media had occupied other space in the building. In February,
1996, it moved to its present location on the third floor of the Highland Plaza building. At that time,
it entered into a new lease agreement, which is Exhibit 1 in this case. After taking possession of the
premises, it installed a work bench or shelf along the south wall of the largest room in its suite. This
shelf or bench was attached to the wall with toggle bolts which required breaking the wall board to
insert the sizeable attachment bolts, which further was attached with various devices which damaged
the underlying wall. In addition, it installed several hanging electrical harnesses which were wired
into the electrical wiring by removing sections of the ceiling. When it left, it detached the equipment,
but left the wires hanging.
Under terms of the law, the bench and the wiring could be regarded as fixtures. They were
installed without the consent of the landlord. There is no other evidence in the record. It is admitted
that the landlord saw these fittings after the lease was entered into, but because it did not give
authority for the installation of it, provisions 9 and 10 are applicable and the landlord is entitled to
costs of repairing the damage caused by the removal. Furthermore, provision 33c gives the landlord
authority to require the removal at the tenant's expense; however, since this was a month-to-month
lease and the tenant was in default, no notice would be required. Therefore, the landlord when
repossessing the premises is entitled to take whatever steps are necessary to restore the premises to
4

a condition identical to that in which it was received by the tenant, less reasonable wear, tear and
depreciation. The work bench and hanging wires cannot be considered reasonable wear, tear and
depreciation.
POINT IV
REMOVING THE DEFENDANT'S SIGNAGE ON THE MARQUEE
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF CONTRACT
OR ABATE THE DUTY TO PAY RENT.
The defendant did not claim a rent abatement because plaintiff removed a marquee
advertisement regarding defendant's business. The court, "suasponte", determined that the removal
of the marquee language was a breach of contract which justified a rent abatement. Utah law,
however, establishes that rent abatements are available only for breaches that defeat the essential
objective of the lease. No evidence would establish that required element in this case, and there was
no evidence offered of the amount of defendant's damages.
In Richard Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme
Court thoroughly analyzed the circumstances under which landlord's breach of the lease will excuse
a tenant's obligation to pay rent. The court concluded:
Not all breaches of covenants by a lessor, however, justify a
lessee in withholding rent. Only a significant breach of a covenant
material to the purpose for which the lease was consummated justifies
a lessee in abating rent. Temporary or minor breaches of routine
covenants by a lessor do not. Thus, if a breach has little effect on the
essential objectives of the lessee in entering into the lease, the lessee
may not withhold rent. Restatement (Second) of Property § 7.1, cmt.
c (1977) states that a covenant is not a significant inducement if "the
landlord's failure to perform his promise has only a peripheral effect
on the use of the leased property by the tenant." A significant
inducement means the "performance of [a] promise [that has] a
significant impact on the benefits the tenant anticipated he would
receive under the lease." Restatement (Second), § 7.1 cmt. c. Thus, in
assessing whether a lessor's breach is sufficient to justify the withholding of rent, a lessee first and a court later, if necessary, must gauge the
materiality of the breach in light of the lessee's purpose in leasing the
5

premises. Relevant to that determination may be whether the breach
has a significant effect on the rental value of the premises.
In sum, we hold that the lessee's covenant to pay rent is
dependent on the lessor's performance of covenants that were a
significant inducement to the consummation of the lease or to the
purpose for which the lessee entered into the lease.
928 P.2d at 377-78 (some citations omitted).
To prove that the marquee listing was material, defendant would have been required to submit
evidence of the value of that listing, and evidence of how much the lease value of the property was
affected by the loss of the listing. No such evidence was presented.
Numerous Utah cases confirm the need for specific evidence of damages. In Bunnell v. Bills.
13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 601 (1962), the court held that "to warrant a recovery based on the
value of the property there must be proof of its value or evidence of such facts as will warrant a
finding of value with reasonable certainty." In Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Co.. 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the court held that M[w]hile the standard for
determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving the fact of
damages, there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a reasonable, even
though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages." 795 P.2d at 336. The court held that where
the issue was whether the plaintiff had lost net income, proof of loss of gross income was insufficient.
Similarly, in Nelson v. Trujillo. 657 P.2d 730,735 (Utah 1982), the court held there was insufficient
evidence to support an award of lost earnings where "the jury had no basis, except pure guesswork,
for estimating earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the future." 637 P.2d at 735 (citation omitted).
The defendant offered no testimony or evidence that the language on the marquee was a
significant inducement to entering into the lease agreement of February 1, 1996. Further, the
defendants offered no evidence or testimony that it had been damaged, but rather continued to pay
6

rent intermittently, after been served with a notice to quit the premises in May, 2002. Multi Media
did not vacate the premises until October 10,2002, and then without notice to the plaintiff Because
there was no evidence of materiality and no evidence of damages, defendant was not entitled to any
abatement of rent.
DATED this _ £ _ day of February, 2004.

KSON HOWARD, for:
tfCKSON
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this *\

day of February, 2004.

Joseph R. Goodman, Esq.
2825 East Cottonwood Parkway, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

G\JH\HALCOMEM
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ADDENDUM #3

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., #7864
JOSEPH R. GOODMAN, JR., L.C.
2825 East Cottonwood Parkway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801)990-3300
Facsimile:
(801)990-3305
Attorney for Multi Media Musketeers and Jeff Brewer

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HAL COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANTS IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 020405666
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and JEFF
BREWER,

Division No. 4

Defendants.
COMES NOW, the above-captioned Defendants, by and through counsel of record,
Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., who hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion. As reasons therefore, Defendants set forth as follows:
BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
First, the Court must recognize that the pertinent findings submitted by Plaintiff are
entirely inconsistent with the findings entered by the Court on January 22,2004, and after a
full trial of the relevant issues. The findings, as drafted, are so skewed in favor of Plaintiff
as to "turn on its ear" what this Court actually ruled when it denied all but one of Plaintiffs
claims. Accordingly, and given this documents conflict with what this Court actually found
on January 22, 2004, they should be given no deference at this time.

What this Court actually found was that Plaintiffs removal of exterior signage acted
as a "constructive eviction" of Defendants, thereby breaching the underlying Lease
Agreement by and between the parties, whether written or oral. Of note, in Plaintiffs
findings, paragraph 10, Plaintiff states that "neither the Plaintiff or the Defendant admit to
placing the Multi Media signage language on the marquee or when it was place on the
marquee." Plaintiff then uses this finding to support paragraph 14 when Plaintiff states that
the sign was not an inducement pursuant to the Lease. The actual findings were that the
sign was placed on the marquee, for some time, and that it was not credible that Plaintiff
had no notice of its presence there. When the Court viewed this finding in light of the letter
presented by Plaintiff and from Defendants detailing the concerns related to the sign, the
Court found that the sign was a significant factor in the entry of a commercial lease, as it
allowed Defendants to have a business presence for its existing customers, and to attract
new customers. Its removal had a negative impact on the Defendants, as testified to by
Jeff Brewer and as offered by Plaintiffs in a letter from Jeff Brewer.
Defendants contend that the sole finding of relevance, both in the trial and at this
point, is that the removal of the sign constituted a constructive eviction of Defendants. As
such, the eviction terminated any obligations to pay monies pursuant to the Lease, and
also precludes Plaintiff from recovery of exorbitant and outrageous attorney's fees
pursuant to the provisions of written lease breached by Plaintiff. This finding of fact, which
was made by the Court, is all that this Court need focus on.
ARGUMENT
1.

This Court has Already Found the Sign to be a Significant Inducement.

Plaintiff takes the facts already presented to this Court, the oral arguments already
made to this same Court, and now expects a different ruling. Such a result cannot be
allowed to occur.
Plaintiff correctly cites the case of Barton v. Tsern, which case was presented by
Defendants at trial, and which case was fully reviewed by this Court prior to a ruling being
given. This Court, after analyzing the evidence presented and the Barton case ruled that
the removal of the sign by Plaintiff constituted a breach of the parties' agreement, and
thereby relieved Defendants of any obligation to pay rent pursuant to the Lease. In short,
Defendants assert that these arguments and case law have already been argued to this
Court, and there is nothing new which would justify this Court in disregarding its earlier
ruling. If Plaintiff was unprepared to deal with the defenses presented, this hearing should
not be allowed as a "do over" for what should have been presented on January 22, 2004.
Plaintiff argues that no evidence was presented related to Defendants' damages
resulting from the removal of the signs.

In making this assertion, Plaintiff disregards

evidence he presented: namely, a letter from Jeff Brewer detailing his consternation over
the removal of the sign and the negative impact on his business.1 After evaluating the
testimony of Mr. Brewer and the letter presented by Plaintiff, this Court found that the
damages suffered by Brewer were significant, and ruled that they were equivalent to the
monthly rental value, thereby extinguishing any claim for damages sounding as unpaid
rent. Further, Defendants did not file a counterclaim, merely offered this evidence as an
affirmative defense, which Court has already moved was sufficient to defeat the claims of
i Plaintiff did not provide copies of this letter to Defendants, and so they are unable to

Plaintiff. Again, the relevant facts were presented at trial and the relevant case law was
argued on January 22, 2004. Again, Plaintiff is not entitled to a "do over."
Plaintiffs also assert that the sign was not an inducement to enter the 1996 written
Lease Agreement. However, as this Court is well aware, the 1996 Agreement had long
expired, and the parties were operating on a month-to-month tenancy, terminable by either
upon 30 days notice. Essentially, the sign was inducement for Defendants to continue
pursuant to this month-to-month tenancy for years after the expiration of the written Lease
Agreement and prior to the eviction. The sign acted as a continuing inducement to remain
in the lease each month Defendants remained on the premises.
Defendants assert that at the time of trial, their burden was adequately met, and this
Court ruled that the actions of Defendant constituted a constructive eviction of Defendants.
This finding is that Plaintiffs, not Defendants, breached the Lease. As such, any
consideration of the Lease provisions must be examined pursuant to this finding.
2.

Plaintiffs Prior Breach Terminates Attorney's Fees Provisions and
Plaintiff Not Entitled to Fees.

What this Court really needs to examine is the true motive of Plaintiff: namely, to
recover an exorbitant and outrageous amount of money from Defendants as and for
attorney's fees. This was the single issue driving the underlying case, and Defendants
would submit, driving this present motion. However, Plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of
attorney's fees only if this Court finds that the written Lease Agreement is applicable.
Given that this Court found that Plaintiffs breached the parties agreement by

submit this document at this time.

removal of signage from the premises, Plaintiffs were in prior breach of the parties'
agreement, whether written or oral. Ih »finding of this Court was that Plaintiff breached
the parties' agreement, and as such, Plaintiff cannot be allowed to recover costs and fees
pursuant to the Agreement which it breached. The applicability of the written Lease
Agreement is irrelevant once this Court found Plaintiff to have breached the Agreement.
As such, the Lease provisions, particularly as to attorney's fees, are no longer applicable,
and Plaintiff has no contractual basis to recover fees.
Undisputed Evidence is that Plaintiff Removed Fixtures.
One fact that was never in dispute, even in the present motion, is that Plaintiff
caused the fixtures on the premises to be removed. Another fact which is not in dispute
was that the fixtures were present shortly after Defendants moved into the premises in
1996, yet Plaintiff never objected to their installation or denial ided their removal. Further,
and even more telling, is that Plaintiff never directed Defendants to remove the fixtures at
the time they vacated Ifle premises, which wotJICI Ilave been in complete conformity with
the written Lease Agreement, were it applicable. As such, when Plaintiff undertook to
remove the fixtures, it did so at is sole risk, and bore any loss associated with sloppy or
shoddy removal of the fixtures. There is no basis, in law or equity, for Plaintiff to be
awarded costs associated with the removal of those fixtures.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's Motion presents "nothing new under the sun." Defendants would suggest
that all the issues presented by Plaintiff's motion were factually developed, the legal
arguments presented and reviewed by the Court, and the matter was fully and fairly

adjudicated at that time. Plaintiff presents no new factual or legal arguments which would
justify this Court disregarding its earlier opinion. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion rnust be
denied and an appropriate set of Findings and Judgment entered. Further, Defendants
should be awarded their reasonable costs and fees incurred in respoi idiiig to this frivolous
motion.
DATED this "3 (

day of March, 2004.

^

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr.
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am employed by Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., L.C., and that I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION, via
facsimile and first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Jackson Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
PO Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Fax: (801)377-4991
on this 2 i _ day of

^/ux.

2004.
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ADDENDUM #4

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr. #7864
JOSEPH R. GOODMAN, JR., L.C.
2825 East Cottonwood Parkway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801) 990-3300
Facsimile:
(801) 990-3305
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HAL COMPANY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020405666
v.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and JEFF
BREWER,

Division 4
Judge Hansen

Defendants.

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of January, 2004, the
plaintiff having appeared by and through its counsel, Jackson Howard, and the defendants having
appeared through its principal officer and co-defendant, Jeff Brewer, and being represented by
their attorney, Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., and the Court having heard testimony, received evidence
and heard arguments, now makes and enters it Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a limited liability company doing business in the State of Utah.

2.

Defendant Multi Media Musketeers is a company doing business in the State of

Utah.
Defendant Jeff Brewer is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
On the T day of February, 1996, Multi Media Musketeers entered into a lease
agreement with Hal Company for certain premises in a building known as
Highland Plaza.
Jeff Brewer signed as guarantor of said lease agreement.
The agreement entered into terminated by its terms on February 1, 1997, and
Defendant operated on the premises on a month-to-month thereafter. The Court
finds the 1996 Lease Agreement to be clear and unambiguous, and to have expired
on February 1, 1997, at which point the parties operated on a month-to-month
tenancy.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs exhibits related to allegedly unpaid rental monies
are in conflict with one another, and are insufficient as a matter of law to establish
any unpaid rental monies due and owing from Defendant.
During the pei iod of the Lease, an extei ioi sign w< as placed • :)i:i the i i larquee in
front of the office complex.

The sign made reference to "Multi Media

Musketeers," and did pi it the public traveling on Highland Drive on notice as to
Defendants' business location.
The sign was removed by Plaintiff over the objection of Defendants in the spring
of 2002, resulting in the loss of business to Defendants. Defendants did protest the
removal of the sign in writing to Plaintiffs, which letter was admitted as evidence
b> Plaintiff

11lis letter offered compelling evidence as to the negative impact on

Defendants business caused by the removal of the sign. The removal of this
exterior sign was a breach on the part of Plaintiff of the parties' month-to-month
tenancy, in that it was a constructive eviction of Defendants on the part of Plaintiff.
10.

Despite repeated efforts on the part of Defendants to amicably resolve the situation
related to the sign, Plaintiffs refused to replace the signage. Plaintiffs peacefully
vacated the premises on or about October 10, 2002.

11.

The plaintiff expended the following sums in repairing the premises after the
defendant vacated the premises:

12.

Replacing Carpet
Painting
Employee Time

$1563.43
$380.00
$400.00

Total

$2343.43

Plaintiff had actual knowledge to the installation and existence of a work bench and
electrical hookups on the leased premises. The work bench and electrical hookups
became fixtures, which Plaintiff removed at the expiration of the Lease at it own
risk. Plaintiff is therefore no( nifidrt) m inovci .iny monies for painting and
employee time related to removing these fixtures. The staining of the carpet was
not reasonable wear, tear and depreciation, and the plaintiff is entitled to the cost
of replacement in the amount of $1563.43.

13

The defendant paid a security deposit at the commencement of the lease on
February 1, 1996, in the amount of $525.00 for which is entitled to credit.
Plaintiffs material breach of the parties' month-to-month Lease Agreement
precludes their recovery of costs and fees in this matter. There is no contractual

basis for Plaintiff to be awarded attorney's fees and costs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The 1996 Lease Agreement is clear and unambiguous, and did expire in February,

2.

Plaintiff did remove Defendants' exterior signage, which removal was a

1997.

constructive eviction on the part of Plaintiff, thereby breaching the parties' month-to-month
tenancy, and relieving Defendant of any obligation to pay monthly rent.
3.

Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof regarding any unpaid monthly rents, and

therefore is entitled to no monies for allegedly unpaid monthly rent.
4.

Plaintiff did have knowledge of the work bench and electrical hookups, did

acquiesce to their presence, and did remove the fixtures at the end of the lease at its own peril,
and is entitled to no compensation thereon.
5.

Plaintiff retained a security deposit in the amount of $525.00 at the expiration of the

lease, which sum should be credited to Defendants.
6.

The damage to the carpet by Defendants was not reasonable wear and tear, and

Plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $1563.43 for the replacement thereof.
7.

Each party to bear their own costs and fees.

8.

Judgment to enter in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1038.45.

DATED this

day of

, 2004.
BY THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., L.C., and that I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
via first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Jackson Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
on t h i s / x W of /XjVcl

2004.

ADDENDUM #5

JACKSON HOWARD (1548), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801)377-4991

Our File No.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
MOTION TO CORRECT DOCKET

vs.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and
JEFF BREWER,

Case No. 020405666
Judge
Division #

Defendants.
Plaintiff submits the following memorandum in support of its Motion to Correct Docket
filed herewith.
A copy of the Court's computer docket is attached. The entries for 05-24-04 reflect that
a judgment was entered. The only document entered on that date, however, was a document
entitled "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." A copy of that document is attached and
will be referred to herein as "Findings and Conclusions."
The Rules of Civil Procedure and the practice in the courts is that findings and
conclusions are separate documents from the judgment. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure states: "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and

the judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A[.]" Rule 58A(b) states that judgments "shall
be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk." These rules, read together, contemplate that
a judgment is a separate document from the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In addition, the Findings and Conclusions entered in this action do not contain language
awarding a judgment. Paragraph 8 of the Conclusions of Law states: "Judgment to enter in
favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1038.48." This sentence is written in the future tense,
indicating that a judgment is to be entered at some point pursuant to the Findings and
Conclusions. The statement does not state that "judgment is entered," but rather "judgment to
enter,"

This wording clearly contemplates the subsequent entry of a separate judgment

document.
No judgment, therefore, has yet been entered. The Findings and Conclusions signed
by the Court do not contain language awarding a present judgment, but contemplate the
preparation of a separate judgment document.

The Rules of Civil Procedure require the

preparation of a separate judgment document. No "judgment" has been signed by the Court or
entered by the clerk. That step would be required for a judgment to exist.
Because no judgment has been entered, the docket entry is wrong. The Court should
order the docket entry corrected to omit any reference to the entry of a judgment.
DATED this \\j)& day of August, 2004.

^ C K S O N HOWARJD, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this \y

day of August, 2004.

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr.
2825 East Cottonwood Parkway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
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ADDENDUM #6

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., #7864
JOSEPH R. GOODMAN, JR., L.C.
2825 East Cottonwood Parkway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801)990-3300
Facsimile:
(801)990-3305
Attorney for Multi Media Musketeers and Jeff Brewer

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HAL COMPANY.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO VACATE FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW/MOTION TO CORRECT
DOCKET/REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES

Plaintiff,
vs.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and JEFF
BREWER,
Defendants.

Case No. 020405666
Division No. 4

Comes now the above-captioned Defendants, by and though counsel of record
Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., who hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law/.Motion to Correct Docket, and as
reasons therefore, sets forth as follows:
BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This matter was tried before Judge Stephen Hansen on January 22, 2004,

with judgment being entered on behalf of Plaintiff on the same date. Pursuant to the Order
of the Court, and upon information and belief, as a result of Plaintiff only being granted a
small portion of the monies sought, the Court ordered counsel for Defendants to prepare

the appropriate pleadings, even though judgment was entered against Defendants and in
favor of Plaintiff.
2.

Counsel for Defendants erroneously believed that Counsel for Plaintiff would

prepare the pleadings, as evidenced by the correspondence mailed to Plaintiffs attorney
on January 26, 2004. (See "January 26, 2004 Letter" attached hereto as Exhibit "A.")
3.

Subsequent to this correspondence, Plaintiff filed pleadings not in conformity

with the Order of this Court, along with supporting documentation. Defendant responded
to these pleadings, and oral argument was held on this matter on April 7, 2004. (See
"Docket," attached hereto as Exhibit "B.")
4.

Pursuant to this hearing, this Court ordered Defendants to submit only

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This was done, and this Court entered the same
on or about May 24, 2004. (Exhibit "B.")
5.

Since May 24, 2004, no activity took place until August 11, 2004, when

Defendants learned that judgment had been entered. At this time, Defendants did contact
Pfafntiff, inquiring about the method and manner of payment. (See "Letter of August 11,
2004," attached hereto as Exhibit "C")
6.

Plaintiff states that it "inquired repeatedly of the Clerk of the Court regarding

the entry of the findings and judgment," and only discovered the May 24,2004 docket entry
on August 9, 2004, or two (2) days before Defendant discovered it on its own on the first
try. There would be no logical explanation as to why Plaintiff failed to discover this entry for
nearly three (3) months, and in spite of repeated inquiries.

ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Already Ruled Upon.

In Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate, dated August 12,2004, paragraph 5 therein, Plaintiff
states "[l]n the alternative, plaintiff moves the Court to allow the parties to reargue the
case." In this statement, Plaintiff acknowledges the only relevant fact now before this
Court: namely, this issue has already been fully briefed and argued, with the Court finding
in favor of Defendants. As set forth by Defendants in the earlier response filed to that
Motion, the argument of Plaintiff is a disagreement over the facts found by the trial court,
not the law applicable to the case. Namely, Defendants presented the relevant case law at
the time of trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement, and ruled accordingly
based upon the facts presented at that time. Those facts were determined in light of the
case law presented at the very time of trial, and reviewed by the trial court at the time of
trial. The law of the case has, at all times, been the same, and there is simply "nothing
knew under the sun" for this Court to now overturn two (2) of its own prior rulings.

As to the findings which have been entered in this matter, Rule 52(a) states that said
Findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Quite obviously,
this is a high burden to meet, but this burden lay squarely on the shoulder of Plaintiff. Utah
courts have held that findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it can be shown that they are
against the clear weight of evidence or that they induce a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The
findings entered in this matter conform with the ruling of the trial court, as opposed to the

findings submitted by Plaintiff which had no relation whatsoever to the facts or law found
applicable by the trial court. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the Findings entered
on May 24, 2004 are erroneous.

Finally, Defendants are quite unclear as to what rule of civil procedure allows
Plaintiff to submit this pleading. Again, this matter has been argued and determined.
Nearly three (3) months elapsed before Plaintiff moves to set aside the Findings. Plaintiff
makes no reference to any rule of civil procedure which contemplates or allows for such
extraordinary relief.

II.

Judgment Submitted Herewith.

However, Plaintiff does correctly point out that no judgment was submitted by
Defendants, although the Docket clearly states that a judgment was entered on May 24,
2004.

Again, making reference to the Docket, Defendants submitted all pleadings

required of them in a timely fashion. The Court, some time later, apparently reviewed
these pleadings and ruled, in effect, by entering the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law submitted by Defendant. This has only been recently learned, and Defendants do
now submit the appropriate pleadings necessary to correct any mistake which may have
been made earlier.

III.

Request for Attorney's Fees.

As set forth in some detail in the earlier reply submitted by Defendants to Plaintiff's

prior motion, attorney's fees are driving this case. The amount originally in controversy
was only slightly more than $3,000.00. This sum of money was well within the jurisdiction
of a "small claims court." However, Plaintiff elected to pursue this matter in a District Court
setting solely so as to grossly inflate the amount allegedly owing by the imposition of
attorney's fees and costs. The trial court correctly denied Plaintiff this remedy when it
granted judgment in the amount of $1,038.45.1

The actions of Plaintiff subsequent to the trial can only be deemed as harassing and
brought in bad faith. Furthermore, given the initial posture of this case, it is reasonable to
assume that the only motivation of Plaintiff is to seek the recovery of excessive and
repugnant attorney's fees. Such action should offend judicial notions of propriety, and
should not be allowed to continue going forward. The only mechanism available to this
Court is to award Defendants fees and costs incurred in now defending a frivolous
pleadings for a second time.

CONCLUSION

This Court has already reviewed Plaintiffs objections to the findings of the trial court,
heard oral argument on the same, and has ruled accordingly. This Court should not
entertain a second "bite at the apple" on this issue. Defendants, in reliance upon the plain
and unambiguous nature of the Docket, was under the reasonable belief that a judgment
l The complaint sought damages in the amount of $3,180.43. At trial, Plaintiff sought
attorney's fees of $3,500.00, approximately six (6) times the attorney's fees incurred by
Defendants in successfully defeating Plaintiffs claims. The award of this Court is but a

had been entered pursuant to prior order of this Court. With this being said, and in an
effort to rectify this possible error, an appropriate Judgment is submitted herewith. Finally,
this Court should exercise its reasonable discretion in awarding Defendants its costs and
fees incurred in defending these frivolous pleadings for a second time.

DATED t h i s ^ 2 . day of August, 2004.

oseph R. Goodman, Jr.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am employed by Joseph R. Goodman, Jr., L.C., and that I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO VACATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW/MOTION TO
CORRECT DOCKET/REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, via first class mail, postage
prepaid, on the following:
Jackson Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
PO Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Fax: (801)377-4991
on this 2JJL day of

(\JUCC

2004

fraction of these grossly inappropriate attorney's fees sought by Plaintiff.

EXHIBIT "A

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr. LC
Attorney at Law
2825 East Cottonwood Parkway
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

Telephone (801) 990-3300
Facsimile (801) 990-3305
Email jrg@jgoodmanlaw.net

January 26, 2004
VIA US MAIL
Jackson Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
POBox 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Re:

HAL Company v. Multi Media et al.

Dear Mr. Howard:
I received your message last week, and wanted to clarify the issue of the judgment entered in this
matter. Namely, the Court ruled that your client could recover the amount prayed for as damages
related to the replacement of the carpet, or $1563.43. However, this sum was reduced by the
$525.00 retained on deposit by your client, reducing the amount of judgment to $1038.43.
Please forward the appropriate Order of Judgment to my office for review upon your completion
of the same.
Feel free to contact me with any questions or concerns.

Veny truly yours,

N

JtfsepWR. Goodman, Jr.

EXHIBIT "B

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HAL COMPANY vs.

MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS

CASE NUMBER 020405666 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
SAMUEL MCVEY
PARTIES
Plaintiff - HAL COMPANY
PROVO, UT 84603
Represented by: JACKSON HOWARD
Defendant - MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
Represented by: JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
Defendant - JEFF BREWER
Represented by: JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

90.00
90.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 2K-10K
Amount Due:
90,.00
Amount Paid:
90..00
0..00
lount Credit:
0..00
Balance:
CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
12-20-02
12-20-02
12-20-02
12-20-02
12-20-02

Case filed by rebeccmw
Judge BURNINGHAM assigned.
Filed: Complaint
Fee Account created
Total Due:
90.00
COMPLAINT 2K-10K
Payment Received:
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 2K-10K
01-30-03 Filed return: Summons
Party Served: MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
Service Type: Personal

90.00
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Service Date: January 27, 2003
01-30-03 Filed return: Summons
Party Served: BREWER, JEFF
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: January 27, 2003
02-18-03 Filed: Answer
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
JEFF BREWER
02-20-03 Filed: Answer
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
JEFF BREWER
03-13-03
03-31-03
05-09-03
05-19-03

Filed: Notice Of Telephonic Attorney Planning Meeting
Filed: Substitution Of Counsel
Filed: Plaintiff's Initial Disclosures
Filed: Notice Of Withdrawal Notice Of Appearance Notice Of
Change Of Address
05-19-03 Filed: Inititial Disclosures
09-20-03 Judge JUDGE assigned.
09-25-03 Filed: Request for Scheduling Conference
09-26-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020405666 ID 1635817
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONF is scheduled.
Date: 11/14/2003
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Third floor, Rm 302
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: DIVISION 04 JUDGE
09-26-03 PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING" CONF scheduled on November 14, 2003 at
10:00 AM in Third floor, Rm 3 02 with Judge JUDGE.
11-14-03 Filed: Attorney Planning Meeting Report
11-14-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Clerk:
shellys
PRESENT
Plaintiffs Attorney (s) : JACKSON HOWARD
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
Video
Tape Number:
78
Tape Count: 10:59

HEARING
TAPE: 78
COUNT: 10:59
Both parties are present, this matter is set for a Bench Trial on

Printed: 08/22/04 13:18:34
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January 22, 2004 1:00 p.m. All Documents counsel is planning on
using at trial must be exchanged at least 30 days prior to trial.
Judge Laycock is presiding for Division #4.
Judge Laycock is on the bench for Division #4.
11-17-03 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on January 22, 2004 at 01:00 PM in Third
floor, Rm 302 with Judge JUDGE.
12-15-03 Filed: Partial Disclosures
01-22-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Trial
Judge:
STEVEN L. HANSEN
Clerk:
emilyp
PRESENT
Defendant(s): JEFF BREWER
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JACKSON HOWARD
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
Video
Tape Number:
7
Tape Count: 1:34

TRIAL
TAPE: 7
COUNT: 1:34
Both parties are represented by counsel, and both present their
opening argument. Mark Dan Fish is sworn in examined &
cross-examined. Sterling Lewis is sworn in examined &
cross-examined. Catherine Schirman is sworn in examined &
cross-examined.
Jackson Howard is sworn in and he testifies as to plaintiffs
attorney's fees. William Clausen is sworn in examined &
cross-examined. Jeff Brewer is sworn in examined & cross-examined.
Mr.""Fish is re-examined & cross-examined. Mrs. Schirmer is
recalled and examined.
COUNT: 4:05
Counsel from both sides present their closing arguments. The
court finds that this is a constructive unlawful detainer, no
attorney's fees are awarded, defendant is order to pay for new
carpet. The security deposit is to be deducted from the carpet bill
, judgment is granted in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$1563.43 minus the security deposit. Joseph Goodman is instructed
to prepare the Judgment and Order. Judge Hansen is presiding for
Div #4 today.
02-09-04 Filed: Motion for Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment and Decree
02-09-04 Filed: Memorandum in support of Motion for Entry of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree
03-10-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020405666 ID 1740030
HEARING ON MOTION is scheduled.
Date: 04/07/2004
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Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Second floor, Rm 203
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: STEVEN L. HANSEN
03-10-04 HEARING ON MOTION scheduled on April 07, 2004 at 08:30 AM in
Second floor, Rm 203 with Judge HANSEN.
03-31-04 Filed: FAXED Memorandum of Defendants in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Findings and Judgment
04-05-04 Filed: Memorandum of Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Entry of Findings and Judgment
04-07-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING ON MOTION
Judge:
STEVEN L. HANSEN
Clerk:
taras
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JACKSON HOWARD
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
Video
Tape Number:
16
Tape Count: 8:43

HEARING
TAPE: 16
COUNT: 8:43
This matter comes before the court for a hearing. The Court
addresses plaintiff's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
Court inquires why Mr. Goodman did not prepare the findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
Mr. Howard argues plaintiff's findings of fact and conclusions of
law. "Mr. Goodman responds. The Court advises Mr. Goodman to
prepare and submit finding of fact and conclusions of law by April
14, 2004.
The Court takes matter under advisement.
04-16-04 Judge MCVEY assigned.
05-24-04 Judgment #1 Entered
Debtor:
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS
Creditor: HAL COMPANY
Debtor:
JEFF BREWER
1,038.45 Total Judgment
1,038.45 Judgment Grand Total
05-24-04 Filed judgment: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judge shansen
Signed May 24, 2004
05-24-04 Case Disposition is Judgment
taras
Disposition Judge is STEVEN L. HANSEN
taras
08-12-04 Filed: Motion to Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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08-16-04 Filed: Motion to Correct Docket
08-16-04 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Motion to Correct Docket
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EXHIBIT "C

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr. L
Attorney at Law
2825 East Cottonwood Parkway
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

Telephone (801) 990-33(
Facsimile (801) 990-33C
Email jrg@jgoodmanlaw.n<

August 11,2004
VIA US MAIL
Jackson Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
POBox 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Re:

HAL Company v. Multi Media et al.

Dear Mr. Howard:
I have not discussed this matter with you since the hearing in April, 2004, but have reviewed the
docket and discovered that the Court entered judgment in favor of your client consistent with the
findings from the trial. Accordingly, as of May 24, 2004, your client has had a judgment against
my client in the amount of $1038.45, which has accrued interest at the post-judgment rate of
3.28%. Please calculate the amount due and owing through the end of August, 2004, so that my
client may tender the funds necessary to satisfy this judgment.
I thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter.

Ve^truly yours,

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr.

ADDENDUM #7

JACKSON HOWARD (1548), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O.Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HAL COMPANY,
REPLY MEMORANDUM
SUPPORTING MOTION TO VACATE
AND MOTION TO CORRECT
DOCKET

Plaintiff,
vs.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and JEFF
BREWER,

Case No. 020405666
Judge Hansen
Division 4

Defendants.
Plaintiff submits this memorandum in reply to defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law/Motion to Correct Docket/Request for
Attorney's Fees dated August 22, 2004.

POINT I
THE DOCKET SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
Defendants apparently agree the docket is wrong. Contrary to the statement in the court
docket, no judgment was actually entered on May 24, 2004. In fact, there has still not been a
judgment entered in this case.
Simply submitting a form ofjudgment at this point does not cure the error in the docket. It
is important that the docket reflect the actual date that the judgment was entered. That date is critical
for calculating the time for appeal and for calculating interest. Because the judgment is clearly

wrong, the Court should order the docket corrected to delete the reference to a judgment being
entered on May 24, 2004.
POINT II
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS WERE APPARENTLY
ENTERED BY MISTAKE.
Defendants have not disputed the assertion, made in paragraph 6 of plaintiff s Motion to
Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, that the Court was leaning in favor of plaintiff but
wanted to see findings and conclusions prepared by defendants before making a decision.
Defendants now claim that the Court "in effect" ruled in defendants' favor by entering the
defendants' proposed findings and conclusions. (Defendants' Memorandum at Section II on page
4.) If the Court had in fact made a conscious choice between the two proposed sets of findings and
conclusions, however, one would have expected the Court to explain its reasoning in a memorandum
decision or ruling. That did not happen, so the reasonable inference is that the findings and
conclusions were simply entered by mistake. Given the volume of paperwork handled by the Court,
it is easy to understand how such a mistake could occur.
Of course, only the Court knows whether the entry of the findings was intentional or
inadvertent. If the findings were entered by inadvertence, as appears likely based on the Court's
comments at the last hearing, then the findings should be vacated.
POINT III
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
IS FRIVOLOUS.
In Section III of their memorandum, defendants request an award of attorney fees.
Defendants did not, however, state any legal basis for the Court to make such an award, but claim
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this

dayof August, 2004.

Joseph R. Goodman, Jr.
2825 East Cottonwood Parkway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84121

SECRETARY'(J"
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The motion to vacate the findings and conclusions is based on the assumption that those
findings and conclusions were entered by inadvertence. That assumption is reasonable because there
is no memorandum decision or ruling explaining why the Court chose defendants' documents over
those submitted by plaintiff, and because the Court's comments at the last hearing indicated the
Court was leaning in favor of the position advocated by plaintiff. If the entry was inadvertent, the
Court should acknowledge the error and correct it. If the entry was not inadvertent, the Court should
explain the reasons for selecting the defendants' proposal over that of the plaintiff.
The request for attorney fees is frivolous and should be denied.
DATED this J # _ day of August, 2004.

N HCn
HOWARD, for:
^CKSON
'HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM #8

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County. State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HAL COMPANY,
plaintiffs

DECISION ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

vs.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and JEFF
BREWER,
defendants

Civil No. 020405666
Judge Samuel D. McVey

After hearing arguments from counsel and reviewing counsels' memoranda, the Court
reviewed videotape of the proceedings in this matter including the bench trial on January 22,
2004. The Court is now ready to rule on the parties' various post-trial motions, submittals and
objections.
As an initial matter, a trial court clearly has jurisdiction and discretion under rule 52 of the
Utah RuTesofCivil Procedure to amend earlier findings and conclusions. Rule52 and case law make
it ck-:ir the trial court can amend up to ten days after entry of judgment. No judgment was entered
in the present case. (See Rod Shepherd Insurance, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650,654 (Utah 1994).)
Next, the Court corrects the earlier conclusion determining the lease did not apply to the
month to month tenancy period. Courts interpret contracts as a matter of law and, as noted, the trial
court can correct legal conclusions at this stage of the case. The holdover provision contained in the
lease in effect before the month-to-month tenancy began provided in relevant part that occupancy
after lh^ 'ease-term expired would continue "upon all the terms hereof applicable to amonthto month
•tenancy." Consequently, terms not applicable to month-to-month tenancy such as the three-year term
or "Early Occupancy" provisions would not apply to the month-to-month tenancy. On the other
hand, the "Rules and Regulations," "Waiver" and various maintenance provisions would apply. We
merely have to look at each term and see whether it has practical application to a month-to-month
tenancy. Because of the specific language in the lease, it is not necessary for the Court to look at the
case law stating written lease terms apply to a subsequent month-to-month holdover. The lease is
the parties' law in this case.
The Court is unwilling to set aside factual findings made after trial unless they are clearly
erroneous. Although the Court was able to watch the trial videotape, the judge presiding at trial was
in a superior position to determine credibility of witnesses and further saw all the exhibits and the
witnesses' interactions with them. The Court will not disturb the trial judge's findings of fact
regarding the material nature of the sign and related facts and their impact on the issue of waiver.

The court also will not disturb findings and factually-premised conclusions relating to rent,
constructive eviction, waste and fixture removal.
1 he earlier findings that plaintiff breached the lease through constructive eviction, however,
docs not ai low defendants to escape responsibility for their own breach. While the Court is familiar
with the general concept that a party in breach of a contract cannot then complain of the other party
's subsequent breaches, the lease contains an anti-waiver clause with respect to contractual terms and
the trial court's findings imply the tenant's commission ofwaste violating the "Repair'1 and "Surrender
of Premises" lease clauses occurred before the sign removal, for which removal defendants get rent
abated. Further since the dispute is governed by the lease, the attorneys fees provisions apply. A
breach of the lease by either party does not waive its application. To state the landlord's violation
of the lease defeats all provisions, including remedies, protecting the landlord who prevails on other
disputed questions has no basis in law, particularly in the light of the waiver provision contained in
the subject lease.
The earlier finding that constructive eviction abates the rent remains. The earlier finding that
defendants committed waste in the amount of $1563.43 remains. That amount is offset by the $525
deposit the landlord retained resulting in a $1038.43 waste amount. Under the unlawful detainer
statute, finding of waste mandates imposition of treble damages. The Court therefore corrects the
earlier finding as a matter of law and sets the waste amount at $3115.29 to which plaintiffis entitled
a judgment. Plaintiffis also entitled to pre-and post-judgment interest at the legal rate since the Court
can find no express interest-rate in the lease. As the prevailing party, having received the net money
judgment, plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee and costs. The fee amount is the
$2,937.50 testified to without objection at trial.
The Court notes defendants did not plead waiver as an affirmative defense as required by the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff raised a general objection at trial to defendants' pleading but did
not press the matter and showed no prejudice. Consequently, this ruling is unaffected by failures to
plead.
If plaintiff would like to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law to comply
specifically with this ruling and serve and file them, the Court will review them and any objections
by defendants. The Court requests plaintiff also submit a form of judgment complying with this
ruling. The court congratulates counsel on zealous representation of their clients.

Dated ZO

Q^dt^LrZOOJ
udge Samuel D. M/6Vey

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020405666 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

JOSEPH R JR GOODMAN
ATTORNEY DEF
2825 E COTTONWOOD PARKWAY
#500
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121
JACKSON HOWARD
ATTORNEY PLA
120 EAST 300 NORTH
P. O. BOX 1248
PROVO UT 84603

Mail

Dated t h i s

fi\

day of

NAME

1\/V>L;A/\C^

//

, 2 0 ^ 5- .

//

Deputy Court Clerk

ADDENDUM #9

FJLED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
~ FEB 0 1 2005

Deputy

JACKSON HOWARD (1548), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22.372-9

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HAL COMPANY,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 020405666

vs.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and
JEFF BREWER,

Division No. 4

Defendants.

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of January, 2004, the
plaintiff having appeared by and through its counsel, Jackson Howard, and the defendants having
appeared through its principal officer and codefendant, Jeff Brewer, and being represented by
their attorney, Joseph R. Goodman, and the court having heard testimony, received evidence and
heard arguments, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT

Utah.

1.

Plaintiff is a limited liability company doing business in the State of Utah.

2.

Defendant Multi Media Musketeers is a company doing business in the State of

3.

Defendant Jeff Brewer is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

4.

On the 1st day of February, 1996, Multi Media Musketeers entered into a lease

agreement with Hal Company for certain premises in a building known as Highland Plaza.
5.

Jeff Brewer signed as guarantor of said lease agreement.

6.

The agreement entered into terminated by its terms on February 1, 1997, and the

"hold-over" provision of the lease became effective.
7.

Provision 20 of the lease states as follows:
HOLDING OVER. If Tenant remains in possession of the
Premises or any party thereof after the expiration of the term
hereof, with or without the express written consent of Landlord,
such occupancy shall be a tenancy from month to month at a rental
in the amount of the last monthly rental, plus all other charges as
payable hereunder, and upon all the terms hereof applicable to a
month to month tenancy.

8.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' exhibits related to allegedly unpaid rental monies

are in conflict with one another, and are insufficient as a matter of law to establish any unpaid
rental monies due and owing from Defendant.
9.

During the period of the Lease, an exterior sign was placed on the marquee in front

of the office complex. The sign made reference to "Multi Media Musketeers/' and did put the
public traveling on Highland Drive on notice as to Defendants' business location.
10.

The sign was removed by Plaintiff over the objection of Defendants in the spring

of 2002, resulting in the loss of business to Defendants. Defendants did protest the removal of
the sign in writing to Plaintiffs, which letter was admitted as evidence by Plaintiff. This letter
offered compelling evidence as to the negative impact on Defendants' business caused by the
removal of the sign. The removal of this exterior sign was a breach on the part of Plaintiff of the
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parties' month-to-month tenancy, in that it was a constructive eviction of Defendants on the part
of Plaintiff.
11.

The staining of the carpet was not reasonable wear, tear and depreciation, and

constitutes waste and the plaintiff is entitled to the cost of replacement in the amount of
$1,563.43.
12.

The defendant paid a security deposit at the commencement of the lease on

February 1, 1996, in the amount of $525.00 for which is entitled to credit.
13.

Under the Findings, 10 and 11, above, the Plaintiff is entitled to treble damages

of $3,115.29.
14.

The plaintiffs attorney performed services which were reasonably necessary based

orr its theory of the case, the fair value of which is $2,937.50.
15.

The defendant vacated the leased premises on October 10, 2002.

16.

The Plaintiff is entitled to pre and post judgment interest at the legal rate; the pre

judgment interest, not compounded, the Court calculates to be $1,354.98, to January 5, 2005.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court having made its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters its conclusions of law.
1.

The lease agreement of February 1, 1996, by reason of Provision 20, carried on

in full force and effect on a month to month basis thereafter while Multi Media occupied the
premises.
2.

It is a firmly established rule that proof of a holding over after the expiration of a

fixed term in a lease gives rise to the presumption, which in the absence of contrary evidence, will
be controlling, that the hold-over tenant continues to be bound by the covenants which were
binding upon him during the fixed term.
3

3.

The defendant has not sought to amend or modify the lease agreement and has not

offered any evidence of damages.
4.

The defendant is entitled to an offset of $525.00 for its security deposit.

5.

Because of the waste committed by the Defendants, the Plaintiff is entitled to

judgment of $1,563.43 less $525.00, security deposit which is $1,048.43, tripled amounts to
$3,115.29.
6.

Because the plaintiff has prevailed substantially in its contentions it is entitled to

be awarded reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $2,937.50.
7.

The plaintiff is entitled to pre and post judgment interest and prejudgment interest

in the amount of $1,354.98.
8.

The plaintiff is entitled to the costs of this action.

DATED this 3j_ day of January, 2005.
BY THE COURT

/S/Samuel P. McVey
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Fourth Judicial District Court
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JACKSON HOWARD (1548), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801)373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,372-9

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HAL COMPANY,
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
Plaintiff,
Case No. 020405666
vs.
MULTI MEDIA MUSKETEERS and
JEFF BREWER,

Division No. 4

Defendants.
The court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now
makes and enters its Judgment and Decree.
1.

Plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendants in the amount of $7,407.77.

2.

Plaintiff is awarded costs of this action.

DATED this P^l day of January, 2005.
BY THE COURT

/S/Samuel D. McVey
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
G:\JH\HALCOJUD
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